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The legal configuration of the crime of genocide has its origins in the writings of
Raphael Lemkin in 1944.1 The concept of genocide first appeared in the Inter-
national Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgement of 30 September and 1 October
1946, referring to the destruction of groups. The definition of the crime of
genocide was based upon that of crimes against humanity, that is, a combination of
‘‘extermination and persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds’’ and it
was intended to cover ‘‘the intentional destruction of groups in whole or in sub-
stantial part.’’2
On 11 December 1946, during its first ordinary meeting, the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) unanimously adopted Resolution 96 (I), declaring that
‘‘the punishment of the crime of genocide is a matter of international concern’’ and
requested the Economic and Social Council to draw up a draft convention on the
crime of genocide. As a result, on 9 December 1948, UNGA Resolution 260A (III)
approved the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (hereinafter: the Convention).3
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The Convention has been broadly ratified and it is widely accepted as cus-
tomary international law and, moreover, as a norm of jus cogens.4 Genocide is an
international crime that can be committed either by States or by individuals.5
Article IX of the Convention gives jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) for disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide.6 Article VI
establishes that persons charged with genocide may be tried ‘‘by such international
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties
which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.’’7 In fact, the crime of genocide is
punishable under Articles 2, 4, and 6 of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statutes, respectively. These
articles repeat verbatim the definition of the crime of genocide provided by Article
II of the Convention:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
4 ICJ: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgement (26 February 2007),
para 142, 161 (tracing prior opinions of the ICJ recognizing that ‘‘the principles underlying the
Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even
without any conventional obligation’’ and ‘‘that the norm prohibiting genocide was assuredly a
peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens)’’) (quoting ICJ: Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Op. (28 May
1951), p. 23, and citing ICJ: Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application:
2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment (3 February 2006), para 64).
For the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, see Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial
Judgment, supra n. 2, para 88. For the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
see, e.g., ICTY: Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic´, IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement (2 August
2001), para 541 (surveying the state of customary international law at the time of the 1995
Srebrenica killings); and ICTY: Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popovic´ et al., IT-05-88-T, Trial Chamber,
Judgement (10 June 2010), para 807.
5 Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, para 179.
6 The ICJ found that Serbia had neither committed, nor conspired to commit, nor incited the
commission of genocide, in violation of its obligations under the Convention. However, the ICJ
found that Serbia had violated the obligation to prevent genocide in respect of the genocide that
occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995. Ibidem, para 471. The ICJ also has, as a pending case, the
application to institute proceedings against Yugoslavia submitted by Croatia on 2 July 1999. See
Raimondo 2005, p. 53.
7 Fifty years after the adoption of the Convention, the first genocide conviction was delivered at
the ICTR (Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S, Trial Chamber, Judgement (4 September
1998), para 745). See Ratner 1998, p. 1; Meron 2000, p. 276; and Musungu and Louw 2001,
p. 196.
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Any of those underlying acts constitute genocide when committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.
In order to appreciate the commission of genocide, proof of the specific genocidal
intent to destroy the targeted group in whole or in part is required in addition to
proof of intent to commit the underlying act.8
2 The Mens Rea
Article II of the Convention defines genocide to mean any of certain ‘‘acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such’’. This intent (or mens rea) has been referred to as,
for example, special intent, specific intent, dolus specialis, particular intent and
genocidal intent.9 This mens rea distinguishes the crime of genocide from
crimes against humanity, in particular persecution and extermination.10 Whether
there was genocidal intent is assessed based upon ‘‘all of the evidence, taken
together’’.11
2.1 Intent to Destroy the Targeted Group as Such
The words ‘‘as such’’ underscore that something more than discriminatory intent is
required for genocide; there must be intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the
8 ICTY: Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic´, IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (19 April
2004), para 20. See also Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, para 186.
9 See for example: ICTR: Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, Trial Chamber,
Judgement (27 January 2000), paras 164–167, which refer to specific intent and dolus specialis
interchangeably; and ICTR: Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber,
Judgement (2 September 1998), para 498, which refers to genocidal intent. While the term
specific intent was used in ICTY: Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic´, IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber,
Judgement (5 July 2001), para 45; Krstic´ Appeal Judgment, supra n. 8, para 134 used the term
genocidal intent. The International Law Commission (ILC) refers to specific intent (Report of the
International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, 6 May–26 July 1996, UN
Doc. A/51/10, p. 87; hereinafter ‘‘Report of the ILC’’). The ICJ used mental element, additional
intent and specific intent interchangeably. Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, paras 187 and 189.
10 Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, supra n. 2, para 89; ICTY: Prosecutor v. Zoran
Kupreškic´ et al., IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement (14 January 2000), para 636. See Morris
and Scharf 1998, p. 167.
11 ICTY: Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic´, IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (22 March
2006), para 55.
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protected group12 ‘‘as a separate and distinct entity’’.13 The ultimate victim of the
crime of genocide is the group.14
The term ‘‘destroy’’ in customary international law means physical or biolog-
ical destruction and excludes attempts to annihilate cultural or sociological ele-
ments.15 According to the ILC, the preparatory work for the Convention clearly
shows ‘‘that the destruction in question is the material destruction of a group,
either by physical or by biological means, not the destruction of the national,
linguistic, religious, cultural or other identity of a particular group’’.16 However,
attacks on cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group often
occur alongside physical and biological destruction and ‘‘may legitimately be
considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group’’.17
‘‘By its nature, intent is not usually susceptible to direct proof’’ because ‘‘only
the accused himself has first-hand knowledge of his own mental state, and he is
unlikely to testify to his own genocidal intent’’.18 In the absence of direct evidence,
a perpetrator’s genocidal intent may be inferred from relevant facts and circum-
stances that can lead beyond reasonable doubt to the existence of the intent,
provided that it is the only reasonable inference that can be made from the totality
of evidence.19 Genocidal intent may be inferred from certain facts or indicia,
including but not limited to: (a) the general context; (b) the perpetration of other
culpable acts systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts
were committed by the same offender or by others; (c) the scale of the atrocities
committed; (d) their general nature; (e) their execution in a region or a country; (f)
the fact that the victims were deliberately and systematically chosen on account of
their membership in a particular group; (g) the exclusion, in this regard, of
12 ICTR: Eliézer Niyitegeka v. Prosecutor, ICTR-96-14-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (9 July
2004), para 53; Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, para 187.
13 ICTY: Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brd¯anin, IT-99-36-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement (1 September
2004), para 698; ICTY: Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic´ and Dragan Jokic´, IT-02-60-T, Trial
Chamber, Judgement (17 January 2005), para 665.
14 See, e.g., Blagojevic´ and Jokic´ Trial Judgment, supra n. 13, paras 656, 665; ICTY: Prosecutor
v. Milomir Stakic´, IT-97-24-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement (31 July 2003), para 521; Akayesu,
supra n. 9, paras 485, 521. See also ICTY: Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic´, IT-95-10-T, Trial
Chamber, Judgement (14 December 1999), para 108.
15 Krstic´ Appeal Judgment, supra n. 8, para 25. See also Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, para
344.
16 Report of the ILC, supra n. 9, pp. 45–46, para 12.
17 Krstic´ Trial Judgment, supra n. 4, para 580. See also Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, para
344.
18 ICTR: Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement
(7 July 2006), para 40. See also ICTR: Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana,
ICTR-95-1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (1 June 2001), para 159; ICTR: Georges Anderson
Nderubumwe Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, ICTR-96-3-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (26 May
2003), para 525.
19 ICTR: Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. Prosecutor, ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Chamber,
Judgement (28 November 2007), para 524.
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members of other groups; (h) the political doctrine which gave rise to the acts
referred to; (i) the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts20; and (j) the
perpetration of acts which violate the very foundation of the group or are con-
sidered as such by their perpetrators.21 Further, proof of the mental state with
respect to the commission of the underlying act can serve as evidence from which
to draw the further inference that the accused possessed the specific intent to
destroy.22
The existence of a personal motive must be distinguished from intent and does
not preclude a finding of genocidal intent.23 The reason why an accused sought to
destroy the victim group ‘‘has no bearing on guilt’’.24
Jurisprudence has held that ‘‘the preparatory work of the Convention of 1948
brings out that premeditation was not selected as a legal ingredient of the crime of
genocide’’ and ‘‘it ensues from this omission that the drafters of the Convention
did not deem the existence of an organisation or a system serving genocidal
objective as a legal ingredient of the crime’’.25 Hence, the ICTR and ICTY
jurisprudence has made it clear that a plan or policy (e.g., a State policy) is not a
statutory element of the crime of genocide.26 Moreover, ‘‘the offence of genocide,
as defined in the Statute and in international customary law, does not require proof
that the perpetrator of genocide participated in a widespread and systematic attack
20 Jelisic´ Appeal Judgment, supra n. 9, para 47. See also ICTY: Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic´
and Dragan Jokic´, IT-02-60-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (9 May 2007), para 123 (noting that
genocidal intent may be inferred from ‘‘evidence of other culpable acts systematically directed
against the same group’’ and therefore ‘‘the forcible transfer operation, the separations, and the
mistreatment and murders in Bratunac town are relevant considerations in assessing whether the
principal perpetrators had genocidal intent’’); Krstic´ Appeal Judgment, supra n. 8, paras 33, 35
(affirming the consideration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group,
including forcible transfer, and ruling that the scale of the killing in the area of Srebrenica,
‘‘combined with the VRS Main Staff’s awareness of the detrimental consequences it would have
for the Bosnian Muslim community of Srebrenica and with the other actions the Main Staff took
to ensure that community’s physical demise’’, permitted the inference that the killing of the
Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica was done with genocidal intent); ICTR: Mikaeli Muhimana v.
Prosecutor, ICTR-95-1B-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (21 May 2007), para 31; ICTR:
Laurent Semanza v. Prosecutor, ICTR-97-20-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (20 May 2005),
para 262.
21 ICTR: Prosecutor v. Callixte Kalimanzira, ICTR-05-88-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement (22
June 2009), para 731; Gacumbitsi, supra n. 4, paras 40–41; ICTR: Prosecutor v. Tharcisse
Muvunyi, ICTR-00-55A-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement (11 February 2010), para 29. See Torres
Perez and Bou Franch 2004, p. 374.
22 Krstic´ Appeal Judgment, supra n. 8, para 20.
23 Jelisic´ Appeal Judgment, supra n. 9, para 49. See also Niyitegeka, supra n. 12, paras 52–53;
Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgment, supra n. 18, para 161. See generally ICTY:
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic´, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (15 July 1999), paras
268–269, declaring that ‘‘personal motives are generally irrelevant in criminal law’’.
24 Stakic´ Appeal Judgment, supra n. 11, para 45.
25 Jelisic´ Trial Judgment, supra n. 14, para 100.
26 Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgment, supra n. 18, para 138; Jelisic´ Appeal Judgment,
supra n. 9, para 48.
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against the civilian population’’.27 This is an important difference when compared
to crimes against humanity.
International tribunals have noted that Article 6 of the ICC Statute, which defines
genocide, does not prescribe the requirement of a ‘‘manifest pattern’’ introduced in
the ICC Elements of Crimes.28 They acknowledged that the language of the ICC
Elements of Crimes, in requiring that acts of genocide must be committed in the
context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct, implicitly excludes random or
isolated acts of genocide.29 However, ‘‘reliance on the definition of genocide given
in the ICC’s Elements of Crimes is inapposite’’. The Appeals Chamber further
clarified that the ICC Elements of Crimes ‘‘are not binding rules, but only auxiliary
means of interpretation’’ of the ICC Statute. Finally, it has been clearly established
by jurisprudence that the requirement that the prohibited conduct be part of a
widespread or systematic attack ‘‘was not mandated by customary international
law’’.30 However, the existence of a plan or policy can be an important factor in
inferring genocidal intent. When the acts and conduct of an accused are carried out
in accordance with an existing plan or policy to commit genocide they become
evidence which is relevant to the accused’s knowledge of the plan; such knowledge
constitutes further evidence supporting an inference of intent.31
2.2 The Targeted Groups
Genocide was ‘‘originally conceived as the destruction of a race, tribe, nation, or
other group with a particular positive identity; not as the destruction of various
people lacking a distinct identity’’.32 The Convention’s definition of the group
adopts the understanding that genocide is the destruction of distinct human groups
with particular identities, such as ‘‘persons of a common national origin’’ or ‘‘any
religious community united by a single spiritual ideal’’.33 A group is defined by
‘‘particular positive characteristics—national, ethnical, racial or religious34—and
27 Krstic´ Appeal Judgment, supra n. 8, para 223.
28 The last element of the crime of genocide reads: ‘‘The conduct took place in the context of a
manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group (…)’’; Elements of Crimes, Doc.
ICC-ASP/1/3 (part II-B), adopted on 9 September 2002.
29 Popovic´ et al. Trial Judgment, supra n. 4, para 829.
30 Krstic´ Appeal Judgment, supra n. 8, para 224.
31 Popovic´ et al. Trial Judgment, supra n. 4, para 830.
32 Stakic´ Appeal Judgment, supra n. 11, para 21.
33 Ibidem, paras 22, 24 (analyzing the drafting history of the Convention and quoting the
interpretation of the Genocide Convention’s protections in the UN Economic and Social
Council’s 1978 Genocide Study, paras 59, 78).
34 International jurisprudence accepts a combined subjective–objective approach for the
identification of the targeted groups. An objective definition can be found, e.g., in Akayesu,
supra n. 9, paras 512–515. A subjective approach (holding that the victim is perceived by the
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not the lack of them’’. A negatively defined group—for example all ‘‘non-Serbs’’
in a particular region—thus does not meet the definition.35
The drafters of the Convention also devoted close attention to the positive
identification of groups with specific distinguishing characteristics in deciding
which groups they would include and which (such as political groups) they would
exclude. The ICJ spoke to the same effect in 1951 in declaring as an object of the
Convention the safeguarding of ‘‘the very existence of certain human groups’’.36
Such an understanding of genocide requires a positive identification of the group.
The rejection of proposals to include, within the Convention, political groups37
and cultural genocide also demonstrates that the drafters were giving close
attention to the positive identification of groups with specific distinguishing well-
established characteristics.38
2.3 Substantiality of Part of the Targeted Group
To establish specific genocidal intent, it is not necessary to prove that the perpetrator
intended to achieve the complete annihilation of a group throughout the world,39
but, at least, to destroy a substantial part thereof.40 Indeed, if a group is targeted ‘‘in
part’’, the portion targeted must be a substantial part of the group41 because it ‘‘must
be significant enough to have an impact on the group as a whole’’.42
(Footnote 34 continued)
perpetrator of the crime as belonging to the group targeted for destruction) was defended, for
instance, in ICTR: Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-T, Trial
Chamber, Judgement (6 December 1999), para 56. See Bou Franch 2005, pp. 145–150.
35 Stakic´ Appeal Judgment, supra n. 11, paras 19–21, 28; Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, paras
193 and 196.
36 Reservations to the Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, p. 23.
37 For a different view, see Van Schaak 1997, p. 2259.
38 Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, para 194.
39 Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, supra n. 2, para 95.
40 ICTR: Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement (15 May
2003), para 316.
41 Akayesu, supra n. 9, paras 496–499; ICTR: Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, ICTR-98-44A-T,
Trial Chamber, Judgement (1 December 2003), para 809; ICTR: Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu
Kamuhanda, ICTR-95-54A-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement (22 January 2004), para 628. The
ICTR, in Semanza, supra n. 40, para 316, held: ‘‘Although there is no numeric threshold of
victims necessary to establish genocide, the Prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the perpetrator acted with the intent to destroy the group as such, in whole or in part. The
intention to destroy must be, at least, to destroy a substantial part of the Group’’.
42 Krstic´ Appeal Judgment, supra n. 8, para 8. According to the ICJ: ‘‘In the first place, the intent
must be to destroy at least a substantial part of the particular group. That is demanded by the very
nature of the crime of genocide: since the object and purpose of the Convention as a whole is to
prevent the intentional destruction of groups, the part targeted must be significant enough to a
have an impact on the group as a whole’’ (Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, para 198).
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The numeric size of the part of the group which is targeted, evaluated in
absolute terms and relative to the overall group size, ‘‘is the necessary and
important starting point’’ in assessing whether the part targeted is substantial
enough, but is ‘‘not in all cases the ending point of the inquiry’’. Other consid-
erations that are ‘‘neither exhaustive nor dispositive’’ include the prominence
within the group of the targeted part, whether the targeted part of the group ‘‘is
emblematic of the overall group, or is essential to its survival’’ and the area of the
malefactors’ activity and control and limitations on the possible extent of their
reach. Which factors are applicable, and their relative weight, will vary depending
on the circumstances of the case.43
3 The Actus Reus
3.1 Killing Members of the Group
The ICTR has defined ‘‘killing’’ as ‘‘homicide committed with intent to cause
death’’.44 For the ICTY, the elements of killing are: the death of the victim, the
causation of the death of the victim by the accused and the mens rea of the
perpetrator.45
Killing may occur where the death of the victim is caused by an omission as
well as by an act of the accused or of one or more persons for whom the accused is
criminally responsible.46 Killing may be established where the accused’s conduct
contributes substantially to the death of the victim.47 The mens rea for killing may
take the form of an intention to kill,48 or an intention to cause serious bodily harm
which the accused should reasonably have known might lead to death.49
To establish the death of the victim, the Prosecution need not prove that the
body of the dead person has been recovered. It may instead establish a victim’s
43 Krstic´ Appeal Judgment, supra n. 8, paras 12–14.
44 Musema Trial Judgment, supra n. 9, para 155; ICTR: Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, ICTR-
2001-66-I, Trial Chamber, Judgement (13 December 2006), para 317.
45 ICTY: Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic´ and Mario Cˇerkez, IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Chamber,
Judgement (17 December 2004), para 37; ICTY: Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvocˇka et al., IT-98-30/
1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (28 February 2005), para 261.
46 Ibidem, para 260; ICTY: Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic´, IT-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber,
Judgement (30 November 2006), para 149. For example, killing may result from the wilful
omission to provide medical care. Kvocˇka et al. Appeal Judgment, supra n. 45, para 270.
47 Brd¯anin Trial Judgment, supra n. 13, para 382; ICTY: Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucic´ et al., IT-
96-21-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement (16 November 1998), para 424.
48 ICTY: Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucic´ et al., IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (20
February 2001), para 423; Kordic´ and Cˇerkez Appeal Judgment, supra n. 45, para 37; Kvocˇka
et al. Appeal Judgment, supra n. 45, para 261.
49 Ibidem, para 261.
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death by circumstantial evidence, provided that the only reasonable inference that
can be drawn is that the victim is dead.50
3.2 Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to Members
of the Group
Article II.b refers to an intentional act or omission that causes ‘‘serious bodily or
mental harm’’ to members of the targeted group. Acts in Article II.b, similarly to
Article II.a, require proof of a result.51 This phrase may be construed to include
‘‘harm that seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or causes any serious
injury to the external, internal organs or senses’’.52 The harm must go ‘‘beyond
temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation’’ and inflict ‘‘grave and
long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive
life’’.53 The harm need not be ‘‘permanent and irremediable’’ to meet the standard
of constituting serious harm.54 ‘‘Serious mental harm’’ entails more than minor or
temporary impairment to mental faculties.55 Moreover, ‘‘to support a conviction
for genocide, the bodily harm or the mental harm inflicted on members of a group
must be of such a serious nature as to threaten its destruction in whole or in
part.’’56 The determination of what constitutes serious harm depends on the
circumstances.57 The harm must be inflicted intentionally to meet the mens rea
requisite for the underlying offence.58
Examples of acts causing serious bodily or mental harm include ‘‘torture,
inhumane or degrading treatment, sexual violence including rape, interrogations
50 Ibidem, para 260.
51 Brd¯anin Trial Judgement, supra n. 13, para 688; Stakic´ Trial Judgment, supra n. 14, para 514.
52 Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, supra n. 2, para 109.
53 Krstic´ Trial Judgment, supra n. 4, para 513; see also Blagojevic´ and Jokic´ Trial Judgment,
supra n. 13, para 645.
54 Krstic´ Trial Judgment, supra n. 4, para 513; see also Akayesu, supra n. 9, para 502; Kayishema
and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, supra n. 2, para 108; ICTR: Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema,
ICTR-95-1A-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement (7 June 2001), para 59; Kamuhanda Trial Judgement,
supra n. 41, para 634; ICTR: Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura et al., ICTR-99-46-T, Trial Chamber,
Judgement (25 February 2004), para 664; Muvunyi Trial Judgement, supra n. 21, para 487; Stakic´
Trial Judgment, supra n. 14, para 516.
55 Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, supra n. 2, para 110.
56 ICTR: Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, ICTR-2001-66-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement (12
March 2008), para 46. See also ICTY: Prosecutor v. Momcˇilo Krajišnik, IT-00-39-T, Trial
Chamber, Judgement (27 September 2006), para 862.
57 Blagojevic´ and Jokic´ Trial Judgment, supra n. 13, para 646; Krstic´ Trial Judgment, supra n. 4,
para 513.
58 Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, supra n. 2, para 112; ICTR: Muvunyi Trial
Judgement, supra n. 21, para 487; Brd¯anin Trial Judgement, supra n. 13, para 690; Blagojevic´ and
Jokic´ Trial Judgment, supra n. 13, para 645.
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combined with beatings, threats of death, and harm that damages health or causes
disfigurement or serious injury to members of the targeted national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group’’.59
The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that forcible transfer ‘‘does not constitute
in and of itself a genocidal act’’.60 However, in some circumstances a forcible
transfer can be an underlying act that causes serious bodily or mental harm, in
particular if the forcible transfer operation was attended by such circumstances as
to lead to the death of the whole or part of the displaced population.61
3.3 Deliberately Inflicting on the Group Conditions of Life
Calculated to Bring About Its Physical Destruction
in Whole or in Part
Article II.c covers methods of destruction that ‘‘do not immediately kill the
members of the group, but, which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction’’.62
The methods of destruction covered by Article II.c are those seeking a group’s
physical or biological destruction.63 In contrast to the underlying acts in Articles
II.a and II.b, which require proof of a result, this provision does not require proof
that a result was attained.64
Examples of methods of destruction frequently mentioned in ICTR Trial Judge-
ments include denying medical services and ‘‘the creation of circumstances that
would lead to a slow death, such as lack of proper housing, clothing and hygiene or
59 Musema Trial Judgment, supra n. 9, para 156; Brd¯anin Trial Judgement, supra n. 13, para 690;
Krajišnik Trial Judgement, supra n. 56, para 859. See also Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, para
319, finding that systematic ‘‘massive mistreatment, [including] beatings, rape and torture causing
serious bodily and mental harm during the [Bosnian] conflict and, in particular, in the detention
camps’’ fulfil the material element of Article II.b of the Convention.
60 Krstic´ Appeal Judgment, supra n. 8, para 33; see also Blagojevic´ and Jokic´ Trial Judgment,
supra n. 20, para 123. The ICJ has held that neither the intent to render an area ethnically
homogenous nor operations to implement the policy ‘‘can as such be designated as genocide: the
intent that characterizes genocide is to ‘destroy, in whole or in part’, a particular group, and
deportation or displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by force, is not
necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group’’. Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, para 190.
61 Blagojevic´ and Jokic´ Trial Judgment, supra n. 13, paras 650, 654.
62 Akayesu, supra n. 9, para 505; Rutaganda Trial Judgment, supra n. 34, para 52; Musema Trial
Judgment, supra n. 9, para 157.
63 Krstic´ Trial Judgment, supra n. 4, para 580. The ICJ ruled that ‘‘the destruction of historical,
cultural and religious heritage cannot be considered to constitute the deliberate infliction of
conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group’’ (Genocide
Convention, supra n. 4, para 344).
64 Brd¯anin Trial Judgement, supra n. 13, para 691, 905; Stakic´ Trial Judgment, supra n. 14, para
517.
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excessive work or physical exertion’’.65 For the ICTY, the conditions are: ‘‘cruel or
inhuman treatment, including torture, physical and psychological abuse, and sexual
violence; inhumane living conditions, namely failure to provide adequate accom-
modation, shelter, food, water, medical care, or hygienic sanitation facilities; and
forced labour’’.66 ‘‘Systematic expulsion from homes’’ has also been cited as a
potential means of inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about destruction.67
Absent direct evidence of whether ‘‘conditions of life’’ imposed on the targeted
group were calculated to bring about its physical destruction, Trial Chambers have
‘‘focused on the objective probability of these conditions leading to the physical
destruction of the group in part’’ and assessed factors like the nature of the con-
ditions imposed, the length of time that members of the group were subjected to
them and characteristics of the targeted group like vulnerability.68
The mens rea standard for the underlying offence of ‘‘deliberately inflicting on
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part’’ is explicitly specified by the adjective ‘‘deliberately’’.69
3.4 Imposing Measures Intended to Prevent Births
Within the Group
Trial Judgements have held that measures intended to prevent births should be
construed as sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control,
separation of the sexes, and the prohibition of marriages. In patriarchal societies,
where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the father, an
example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the case where,
during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated by a man of
another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child who will conse-
quently not belong to its mother’s group. Further, measures intended to prevent
births within the group may be physical, but can also be mental.70
65 See, e.g., Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, supra n. 2, paras 115–116; Musema Trial
Judgment, supra n. 9, para 157.
66 Krajišnik Trial Judgement, supra n. 56, para 859; Stakic´ Trial Judgment, supra n. 14, paras
517–518; Brd¯anin Trial Judgement, supra n. 13, para 691.
67 Akayesu, supra n. 9, para 506; Stakic´ Trial Judgment, supra n. 14, para 517; Brd¯anin Trial
Judgement, supra n. 13, para 691.
68 Akayesu, supra n. 9, para 505; Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, supra n. 2, paras
115, 548; Brd¯anin Trial Judgement, supra n. 13, para 906. The ICTY held that ‘‘living conditions,
which may be inadequate by any number of standards, may nevertheless be adequate for the
survival of the group’’ (Krajišnik Trial Judgement, supra n. 56, para 863).
69 See Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, para 186: ‘‘Mental elements are made explicit in
paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article II by the words ‘deliberately’ and ‘intended’ (…). The acts, in
the words of the ILC, are by their very nature conscious, intentional or volitional acts’’.
70 Akayesu, supra n. 9, paras 508–509; Rutaganda Trial Judgment, supra n. 34, para 53.
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To amount to a genocidal act, the evidence must establish that the acts were
carried out with intent to prevent births within the group and ultimately to destroy
the group as such, in whole or in part.71
3.5 Forcibly Transferring Children of the Group
to Another Group
With respect to forcibly transferring children of the group to another group, the
Trial Chambers have speculated that, as in the case of measures intended to
prevent births, the objective is not only to sanction a direct act of forcible physical
transfer, but also to sanction acts of threats or trauma which would lead to the
forcible transfer of children from one group to another.72 The ICC Elements of
Crimes specify that the person or persons transferred must be under the age of
18 years.
4 Final Considerations
During the first half century after the adoption of the Genocide Convention, no
international tribunal decided a case of genocide. During those years, genocide
was, at best, a crime reserved for domestic tribunals, as was the case in Eichmann
Jerusalem District Court Judgement. However, in the last twelve years three
international tribunals (ICTR, ICTY and ICJ) have dealt in extensive detail with
genocide, the crime of crimes, establishing a well-settled jurisprudence on its
different constituent elements. It seems worth noting that the Achilles’ heel of this
jurisprudence concerns the definition of the last two types of the actus reus of the
crime of genocide, where international jurisprudence is highly speculative as there
has been no single case of these types.
71 Genocide Convention, supra n. 4, paras 355–356, 361. In response to the Applicant’s claims,
including that ‘‘forced separation of male and female Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as
systematically practiced when various municipalities were occupied by the Serb forces (…) in all
probability entailed a decline in birth rate of the group, given the lack of physical contact over
many months’’, and that ‘‘rape and sexual violence against women led to physical trauma which
interfered with victims’ reproductive functions and in some cases resulted in infertility’’, the ICJ
found that no evidence was provided as to ‘‘enable it to conclude that Bosnian Serb forces
committed acts which could be qualified as imposing measures to prevent births in the protected
group within the meaning of Article II(d) of the Convention’’.
72 Akayesu, supra n. 9, para 509. See Fernandez-Pacheco 2011, pp. 76–77.
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